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Abstract 
 
In the last couple of years there have been a lot of debate and discussion in the 
media and academia concerning Iran´s nuclear program and the possibility that 
they want to develop nuclear weapons. This paper will seek to explain why a state 
may take the important decision to develop nuclear weapons and why some states 
never make that choice. By using Iran as an example the paper seeks to present 
five different models that each has a different answer to this question. The models 
presented in this paper will have their theoretical basis in five different 
approaches: Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism, Feminism and Political 
Psychology. Each model focuses on different aspects of Iran’s situation and explain 
why that aspect is important to understand. By presenting these models the paper 
hopes to give the reader a fundamental understanding of the nuclear non-
proliferation debate and why it can be very difficult to know how to respond when 
new states are accused of trying to develop nuclear weapons. 
 
Key words: Iran, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Proliferation, Realism, Liberalism, 
Constructivism, Feminism, Political Psychology.  
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1 Introduction 
 
“We knew the world would not be the same. Few people laughed, few people 
cried, most people were silent. I remembered the line from the Hindu 
scripture, the Bhagavad-Gita. Vishnu is trying to persuade the Prince that he 
should do his duty and to impress him takes on his multi-armed form and says, 
"Now I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds." I suppose we all thought 
that, one way or another.”  
J. Robert Oppenheimer ”Father of the atomic bomb” on the first nuclear test. 
On the 6 of august 1945 the Japanese city of Hiroshima was completely levelled by 
the first nuclear bomb used in battle, the United States had finished developing the 
weapon only a short time before and was therefore the first country in the world 
to have nuclear weapons. This event was a revolution, not only in military 
development but in human history as it proved that humanity now had the 
technological capability to destroy itself should a third world war ever happen. In 
the almost 70 years since, another nine countries have joined the so called 
“nuclear club” but thankfully since the end of World War II no further nuclear 
weapons have been used in battle. Nuclear weapons, because of their unparalleled 
destructive power, present a unique threat to international security and the safety 
of humans everywhere. During the cold war stockpiling nuclear weapons was one 
of the things that the US and USSR competed in and immense amounts of nuclear 
weapons, enough to wipe the earth clean of life many times over, was constructed 
(Shelling, 2008, 20-21). Currently the global nuclear stockpile is estimated to be at 
ca 16 300 of which 3970 are deployed and can be used with little or no preparation 
(SIPRI Yearbook 2014). This is a steady decrease since the end of the cold war in 
the late 1980s when the global stockpile was over 60 000. Every year for the past 
quarter of a century an average of over 1700 nuclear weapons have been 
dismantled and one nation, South Africa, has left the nuclear club. But despite this 
massive drop in the amount of nuclear weapons in the last decades everything is 
not going in the right direction and since the cold war ended two more countries 
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(Pakistan and North Korea) have joined the nuclear club and several other states 
have been accused of trying to do so including Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Libya 
(Baylis and Smith, 2008, 397).  
The aim of this paper is to answer the question why a country makes the decision 
to try to build nuclear weapons. Building nuclear weapons is an expensive and 
potentially very dangerous move for a county to make and not a decision that can 
be taken lightly, especially in the post-cold war era. Yet still nations continue to 
make huge investments in their nuclear capacity both for civilian and sometimes 
military use. So what drives a country to make this fatal decision? I feel that many 
people take it for granted that states like Iran or North Korea would want nuclear 
weapons witch is quite odd as quite few sates actually try to develop them. Thus I 
think it is important to ask why these states do so if we are to make any serious 
attempts to persuade other states not to follow in their footsteps. The aim of this 
paper is not to say that one theory is right and another wrong but rather to 
present the different approaches to the problem and how I believe that the 
different theories relate to each other both on a theoretical and practical level. 
Naturally I will also present my own ideas and beliefs but more as an example of 
my reasoning than as an attempt to convince anyone that my opinion is the right 
one compared to others. Hopefully this will give the reader a clear picture of the 
problem at hand and the various methods that can be employed to discourage 
further states from developing weapons of mass destruction as discouraging states 
from developing WMD:s is, in the long run, impossible if we do not fully 
understand why they try to develop them in the first place. 
1.1 Question 
Why does a country chose to develop nuclear weapons? 
1.2 Method 
To attempt to answer this question I will look at the different theoretical 
approaches that are dominant in International Relations theory and then try to 
make an argumentative analyze of these different theories to see their strength 
and weaknesses. I will look mostly on academic texts and books and make textual 
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and argumentative analyses of these texts to see how they explain their answers. I 
will exemplify by using Iran as a case study by which to present the arguments 
made by the different theoretical approaches. I will present the different theories 
and make a comparative analyses of their rezoning and ideas. 
To simplify the text I will divide it into five parts based on five different models of 
explaining the question. These five models will take their basis in different theories 
predominant in international relations studies.  I will start with two “older” 
positivist theories that dominated the International Relations during much of the 
20:th century: Realisms and Liberalism and then look at more “modern” post-
positivist approaches to the same problem. To make my argument as clear as 
possible I will use a case study of Iran and how the different models would explain 
why a country in Iran’s position would make the decision to develop nuclear 
weapons. The case is not meant to represent a unique situation but rather to give 
a framework on how to answer the question on any given county based on 
different models and ways of thinking.  
Note that the relationship between the theories and the models of explanations 
are not always as clear as they may seem in this paper and different theories can 
reach very similar answers to explain a problem like this one. Naturally not every 
single realist believes in International security model or every feminist adhere to 
the reasoning presented in this paper. Despite this I have chosen to attribute each 
model to a distinct theory to make it simpler to follow my reasoning concerning 
the different models. For all intents and purposes I will use the name of the 
models and the name of the theories interchangeably (unless specifically stated 
otherwise) even though that is a great simplification. As you will see many of the 
explanations can be, at least at a surface level, very similar but with some 
important distinctions. Obviously it is impossible to include all possible models of 
explanation and all theoretical grounds given the limits of this essay so I have 
chosen these because they represent some of the fundamental different views 
that exist on the subject.  
 
 I will focus mostly on the case of Iran as it is the most resent state to make an 
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attempt at joining the nuclear club and has gained a great deal of attention from 
the world media . At a first glance Iran may not be the best example as they do not 
yet have nuclear weapons and many now believe that they might never take the 
final step and build a nuclear bomb. However I believe that Iran is a valid case for 
this study as it is generally believed that they at some point tried to develop 
nuclear weapons which make the question of why they made that decision valid 
(Shahram, 2014, 66-67). It is also important since a lot of people believe that Iran 
wants nuclear weapons and therefore and it is important to understand why as it 
will explain to some degree why Iran and not another country are perceived to 
want nuclear weapons. Iran’s position in one of the most problematic regions on 
earth also makes it a fascinating case to examine even if it’s only in theory. In the 
past years there has been a great deal of debate concerning Iran’s nuclear 
capability. So while the question should perhaps be rephrased as “why would a 
country chose to develop nuclear weapons?” I feel that it is important and 
enlightening to analyze and understand the case of Iran. 
The nuclear weapons debate started even before the weapons themselves existed, 
focusing on the morality of building weapons of such destructive potential. 
However the Second World War started and the US Manhattan project (the project 
that developed the nuclear weapons) started and resulted in the creation of the 
first nuclear bombs and (thankfully) the only time so far that they have been used 
in actual combat’s the bombings of the Japanese cites of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
in 1945. The US believed at the time that their nuclear monopoly would last 10-15 
years but unfortunately for the US the security of the Manhattan project was 
severely lacking.  Thanks to a number of spies in the Manhattan project the Soviet 
Union was able to start their own project almost immediately and in 1949 made 
their first nuclear test. The changed dynamic made the nuclear debate take a new 
direction and focused more and more on the competition between the two 
superpowers and the role that nuclear weapons played in this dynamic as an 
ultimate method of deterrence resulting ultimately in the so called Mutually 
Assured Destruction (MAD) theory. Fear of the other retaliating would always keep 
the two superpowers from waging wars against each other and thus nuclear 
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weapons would help us avoid WW 3, or at least this was the theory. 
After the Soviet Union more and more nations made the decision to create nuclear 
weapons and in 1952 the UK became the third nation to join the nuclear club and 
was soon followed by France and China in 1960 and 1964 respectively. At some 
point, presumably in the late 1960s Israel acquired nuclear weapons but made no 
test and has still not officially confirmed that they have nuclear weapons. 
Following the Cuban missile crises in 1962 the fear of nuclear war increased and a 
worldwide effort to limit the possibility of nuclear conflict lead to the creation of 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968. The treaty 
banned nuclear weapons from all states except the five already officially existing 
nuclear states (US, Soviet Union, UK, France and China) and encouraged these to 
cooperate to limit nuclear danger. The treaty was eventually signed by every state 
except Israel, Pakistan, India and South Sudan (North Korea withdrew in 2003). In 
1974 India tested its first nuclear device and sometime in the 1980s South Africa 
acquired nuclear weapons and became the last nation to do so during the cold war 
and also the first nation to dismantle their nuclear forces which they did in 
1989/90. The end of the cold war also ended the bipolar world and the eminent 
fear of nuclear wars for many people, this new more multipolar dynamic gave rise 
to new theories on the importance of nuclear weapons. In 1998 Pakistan made its 
first nuclear test and in 2006 North Korea became the latest nation to do so. 
 
1.3 Existing Literature 
 
The current literature on the spread of nuclear weapons is mostly focused on how 
to stop/discourage states from acquiring them or how states “build” them and 
generally seems to take it for granted that some (or even most) states wants 
WMD:s and therefore dose not focus on why they want them in the first place. 
Naturally there are some who has attempted to answer this question but these 
tend mostly to argue in favor of their own opinion and focuses on a single 
explanation and argue that that one is the most important (for example Waltz 2003 
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and O’Reilly, 2012 ). Among the articles that do try to answer this question in a 
more “objective” way the most predominant and “quoted” article  is still Scott 
Sagans article Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a 
Bomb from 1996/97. In this article Sagan presents the three most common 
explanations used when talking about why states go nuclear; The Security model, 
The Domestic Politics Model and the Norms Model (more about these later). 
Sagans article is still used by many as a blueprint for analyzing this problem (for 
example Sherrill 2012 and Steven 2010) and while the article is very good it is 
almost 20 years old and obviously not up to date in the theoretical field of 
international relations politics and especially not in the non-positivistic parts of the 
field that has seen great expansion in the last 10-15 years. Areas such as Feminism 
and Political Psychology have seen a lot of work connected to this area lately.  With 
this in mind I will try to expand the model to include more of the newer ideas and 
focus more on the similarities and differences between the positivistic and non-
positivistic models of explanation. Since there are now too many models to fit 
neatly into such an essay I will split this paper into two parts one Positivistic and 
one Non- Positivistic. These parts will in turn be split into models of explanation 
based on specific theories that provide some examples of these two main 
approaches and discuss how they can relate to each other. Three of the models 
presented in this paper are the models presented by Scott Sagan in his article from 
1996 and I have added two more models from more “modern” theoretical 
approaches.  
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2 Case Study 
 
2.1 The case of Iran, History, Politics and Culture 
 
The modern history of Iran is often considered to start with the disposal of the 
ruling Qajar Dynasty by Reza Khan in 1925. Reza Khan proclaimed himself Shah 
(king) under the name Reza Shah Pahlavi. He immediately launched an ambitious 
campaign to modernize the country. Among other plans, he hoped to develop a 
national public education system, build a national railroad system and improve 
health care.  At the same time he consolidated his own power and created a strict 
dictatorship with a strong nationalistic, militaristic and anti-communistic policy. 
Reza Shah modernized the country to try to close the great power gap with the 
western powers that had previously had great influence in Iran and he also tried to 
modernize both the army and the economy in order to make Iran stronger. Unlike 
most of the Middle East and Asia Iran was never officially colonialized but was 
nonetheless under very strong economic and politic influence from Russia and the 
British Empire in the 19:th century. In 1941 Reza Shah was forced to abdicate by a 
Soviet and British invasion as a part of World War II.  Iran was officially neutral but 
Reza Shah was considered by the Soviet Union and Great Britain to be to pro-
German and Iran´s oil was to important for the allies to let him remain in power. He 
was succeeded by his son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Mohammad (in the West 
often referred to simply as “the Shah of Iran”) continued his father’s project to 
modernize Iran but unlike his father made close connections to the western 
powers and especially the United States.  
Iran started its nuclear program under the Shah the years following the start of the 
cold war and was one of the original states to sign the NPT in 1968 thereby 
promising to only develop nuclear power for peaceful purposes. If the Shah 
intended to follow this is unknown but likely given his close relations with the US. 
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In the 50s and 60s Iran enjoyed a great deal of economic support to their nuclear 
program from the US (and to a lesser extent other western nations) under the 
Atom for Peace program and there were a great deal of cooperation between the 
two states (Barzashka and Oelrich 2012, 4-5).  In 1972 Iran refused to join the Arab 
countries in the oil embargo and instead increased the oil price, something that 
gave them a lot of money, some of which were used to continue and expand the 
nuclear program. Despite this the Shah´s regime grew ever more unpopular as he 
gave himself more and more power and the regime became increasingly 
oppressive, brutal, corrupt, and extravagant (Mousavian, 2013, 145). Many of the 
people of Iran also accused the Shah of being a puppet for the United States, the 
secular policy of the Shah also aggravated large parts of the deeply Muslim 
population of Iran. In 1979 the unhappiness with the regime became too much and 
a revolution lead by Muslim fundamentalists forced the Shah out of Iran. Iran was 
reorganized as the Islamic Republic of Iran with the supreme leader Ruhollah 
Khomeini becoming the de-facto leader of the country (Barzashka and Oelrich 
2012, 10). 
After the revolution of 1979 Iran went through many noticeable changes and It´s 
relations with the US and Israel became much worse and all cooperation with the 
US came to an abrupt stop. Following the revolution and the Iran hostage crisis the 
US started to imply economic sanctions towards Iran to discourage further 
development of nuclear capabilities (among other things). Without foreign support 
the Iranian nuclear program initially slowed to a crawl as the need for more 
materials were growing without significant supplies. The revolution in Iran brought 
swift political changes in the region and Iraq invaded in 1980 to strengthen its own 
position. During this war both the United States and the Soviet Union supported 
Iraq (at least nominally), the war become extremely expensive for Iran and also 
damaged several nuclear power plants further slowing down the development of 
nuclear energy. In 1981, Iranian governmental officials concluded that the 
country's nuclear development should continue. After the end of the war with Iraq 
the Iranian government started to more seriously invest in its nuclear program as it 
felt isolated and without allies despite support from the International Atomic 
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Energy Association to their civilian nuclear program. In 1983, IAEA officials were 
keen to assist Iran in the chemical aspects of reactor fuel fabrication, chemical 
engineering and design aspects of pilot plants for uranium conversion, corrosion of 
nuclear materials, LWR fuel fabrication and pilot plant development for production 
of nuclear grade UO2. In 1984 the nuclear program restarted for real and it is 
believed by some (Barzashka and Oelrich 2012, 12) that this is also when it was 
decided to try to develop nuclear weapons and not only a civilian nuclear program. 
Sometime in the late 80ies Iran received some minor technical support from 
Pakistan whose nuclear program was noticeably further along the road of 
constructing nuclear bombs. However no serious cooperation between the two 
sates became possible partly because of political differences. In 1995 Iran signed a 
large contract with Russia to receive help in building their nuclear facilities 
meanwhile the US persuaded most other states not to help Iran with their civilian 
nuclear program and in 1996 further sanctions were placed upon Iran with 
reference to their nuclear ambitions. In 2002 documents were reviled that proved 
that Iran was indeed trying to develop nuclear weapons and in 2003, possibly as a 
response to the US invasion of Iraq, the Supreme Leader of Iran suspended the 
military part of Iran’s nuclear program (Mousavian, 2013, 148).  
Iran is a theocratic republic whose government is split into several different 
branches. The most powerful political office in Iran is that of the Supreme Leader 
who is appointed and supervised by the Council of Experts which is a 
democratically elected body. Supreme leader is the Head of State with some 
Executive powers related to Defense, Religious affairs and the Guardian Council. 
The Council of Experts is a body of 86 "virtuous and learned" clerics elected by 
adult suffrage for eight-year terms. The Council supervises the Supreme leader and 
can in theory remove him from office but there has been no case of the counsel 
and Supreme Leader opposing each other so if this works in practice is unclear. 
The Supreme Leader choses people for some of the most important positions in 
Iran including the supreme commander of the military, the Chief Judge and half 
the members of the Guardian Council.  He can veto the laws made by the 
parliament and legally he permits for presidential candidates to proclaim their 
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candidacy. Also the declaration of war and peace is to be made by the Supreme 
Leader together with a two third majority of the Parliament. 
The legislative branch in Iran is split into three parts: The firsts is the Parliament 
(Majlis) which consists of 290 members elected for four-year terms. The 
Parliament drafts legislation, sanctions international treaties, and approves the 
national budget amongst other things. All Parliament candidates and all legislation 
from the assembly must be approved by the Guardian Council. 
The second part of the Guardian Council is composed of 12 jurists, including six 
clerics appointed by the Supreme Leader, and six jurists elected by the Parliament 
from among the Muslim jurists nominated by the Head of the Judicial System. The 
Council interprets the constitution and may reject bills from parliament deemed 
incompatible with the constitution or Sharia (Islamic law). These are referred back 
to parliament for revision. In an exercise of its authority, the Council has drawn 
upon a narrow interpretation of Iran's constitution to veto parliamentary 
candidates.  
The third part of the legislative branch is the Expediency Council. The counsel has 
the authority to mediate disputes between the Parliament and the Guardian 
Council. While this is their only official duty the Expediency Council also serves as 
the Supreme Leaders main advisory body and as such has great influence and 
power. The Councils members include heads of the three government branches, 
the clerical members of the Guardian Council and various other members 
appointed by the supreme leader for three-year terms. 
The Executive branch of the Iran government is led by the President of Iran, the 
president is officially the highest position in Iran after the Supreme Leader.  The 
President is elected by universal suffrage, by those 18 years old and older, for a 
term of four years, however all candidates for the president post must first be 
approved by the Guardian Council before they run for presidency (no woman has 
ever been approved by the counsel even thou they can technically become 
president).  The Guardian Council does not announce publicly the reason for 
rejections of particular candidate although those reasons are explained to each 
candidate. The President appoints and supervises the Council of Ministers, 
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coordinates government decisions, and selects government policies to be placed 
before the legislature. While Iran has universal suffrage formal political parties are 
a relatively new phenomenon in Iran and many conservatives still prefer to work 
through political pressure and lobby groups rather than parties. Often political 
parties or coalitions are formed prior to elections and disbanded soon thereafter. 
This makes the democratic aspects of the Iran system les important then it may 
seem in theory (Mousavian, 2013, 150). 
Like in many states the military has significant political influence in Iran. The 
military is officially directly responsible to the Supreme Leader and reports only to 
him. Iran has two types of armed forces: the regular forces divided into Islamic 
Republic of Iran Army, Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force and the Islamic Republic of 
Iran Navy and the Revolutionary Guards that stand outside the regular army 
totaling almost 500,000 active troops. Since the Iranian Revolution, to overcome 
foreign embargo, Iran has developed its own military industry, produced its 
own tanks, armored personnel carriers, guided missiles, submarines, military 
vessels, destroyer, radar systems, helicopters and fighter planes. Because of this 
the military industry is also of great importance in Iran but Iran still import lots of 
military material from non-western states (Barzashka and Oelrich 2012, 15). 
With a population just short of 80 million and covering almost 1.7 million Km² Iran 
is one of the largest states in the Middle East region. As an Islamic republic Islam is 
the state religion and a vast majority of the people are Shia Muslims with some 
other religious minorities. Approximately 60-65% of the population is ethnical 
Persians with Kurds and Azerbaijanis being the two largest minority groups. As the 
Muslim Sharia laws are part of the Iranian constitution Islam has a great impact on 
the culture of Iran but with a significant amount of pre-Islam Persian influence. 
Iran is a mixed economy with a nominal GDP of $404,132 ($1,334.3 in PPP) where 
the state is the most important economic actor, some 60% of the economy 
is centrally planned. Iran´s economy is strongly dependent on the oil and gas 
exports with China being the most important buyer. With 10% of the 
world's proven oil reserves and 15% of its gas reserves, Iran is considered to have 
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the potential to become an economic major power. Sanctions from the rest of the 
world and political corruption have greatly hampered Iran´s economic 
development and some 30 million is believed to live under the relative poverty line 
(CIA World Factbook, 2015).  
 
 
2.2 IAEA and the ongoing discussion.  
 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an international organization 
that was founded in 1957 with the purpose of promoting the development of 
civilian nuclear energy and at the same time prohibit the development and spread 
of nuclear weapons. One of the IAEA main tasks is to inspect the nuclear facilities 
of the membership states to insure both that they follow the agreed upon safety 
regulations and that the facilities are for solely civilian purposes. This can be very 
problematic as a large functioning civil nuclear infrastructure automatically gives 
the technological ability to enrich uranium to the point where you can use it for 
military purposes (although this alone is not enough to build a nuclear bomb). Iran 
has been repeatedly accused of trying to use civilian nuclear facilities to enrich 
uranium to the point where they are close to build nuclear weapons and 
withholding information from the IAEA. Iran has on a number of occasions denied 
the IAEA inspectors the transparency they demand in accordance with the NPT. In 
2003, as a result of these accusations, the three largest states of the European 
Union, France, Germany and the United Kingdom (aka the EU-3) started 
negotiations with Iran about how to proceed with their nuclear program in a 
manner that could insure that Iran had no military intentions with it. Iran argues 
that without uranium enrichment capabilities that the country will in the long run 
be dependent on others to provide energy for them. Initially these talks met with 
little success as Iran refused to be dependent upon anyone else and the EU-3 felt it 
could not let Iran continue their program without more transparency. In 2006 the 
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remaining permanent members of the UN Security Council (Russia, China and the 
United States) joined the negotiations trying to convince Iran to agree to the 
demands of the IAEA (Fitzpatrick, 2006, 528-529). However the negotiations still 
did not precede as intended and as a result, four resolutions were put in place by 
the United Nations Security Council: they demanded to suspend 
all Uranium enrichment and heavy water (another material needed for nuclear 
bombs) activities and restricted acquisition of nuclear and ballistic materials by 
Iran. The continuing refusal by Iranian authority to make clear declarations and to 
allow sufficient inspections of their nuclear facilities then convinced the EU to 
enforce additional sanctions on civilian goods and services such as financial 
activities and energy sector technologies. In 2012, an oil embargo and restrictive 
financial boycotts were enforced by the EU, in addition to UN sanctions against 
Iran. Not until November 2013 did the negotiations lead to any serious progress 
when the Geneva interim agreement was signed by all the parties.  The deal 
consists of the short-term freezing of key parts of the Iranian nuclear program in 
exchange for a decrease in sanctions, as both sides work towards a long-term 
agreement. Most states have shown a positive reaction to the deal as it is seen as a 
way to keep Iran from developing nuclear weapons but at the same time limit the 
sanctions on Iran that de facto hurts a lot of civilians. Israel have however been 
very critical of the deal feeling it legitimizes Iran´s nuclear ambitions and echoes 
the deals made with North Korea when trying to keep them from developing 
nuclear weapons, something that failed. Others claim that Iran has a history of not 
honoring international deals (such as the NPT) and that it is naïve to believe that 
they will honor this one (Chubin, 2014, 70-71). Nonetheless all parties seem to be 
content with the deal and negotiations on how to implement it and how to 
continue has started. However this is only a start and it´s still a long way to reach 
any consensus in how to solve the problem on a long term basis as the parties still 
have very different goals with the negotiation. The P5+1 want to be sure that Iran 
never develops nuclear weapons and Iran wants to be totally independent in terms 
of energy and politics. 
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3 Theories 
In this chapter I will present five different models that are used for explaining why 
states choses to build nuclear weapons. The models are each connected to one of 
the main theories in international relations. 
3.1 Positivism  
Positivism is the idea or belief that social sciences can and should be approached in 
the same manner as natural sciences such as physics. Knowledge is achieved 
through empirical studies and experiments of the world around us. Positivism 
holds that society, like the physical world, operates according to general laws. 
Introspective and intuitive knowledge is rejected, as is metaphysics and theology. 
Positivists hold the ontological and epistemological belief that there is an objective 
truth, a “real world” for humans to study and that we can study it if we simply keep 
ourselves objective and use scientific experiments to analyses that what we see. By 
observing historical examples and contemporary happenings we can predict what 
will happen, assuming similar things has happened in the past, or at least that is 
the general idea. Because of their beliefs in empiricism many positivist believe in 
universal “rules” that governs social sciences just as the rules of physic governs 
natural sciences. The most famous such rule is, arguably, the Liberal idea of 
democratic peace. These rules are held to be universal and unchanging over time 
and space. Positivism in the modern sense is generally attributed to 19:th century 
thinkers such as Auguste Comte (1798–1857) but the general idea of this approach 
is far older and has been used in social science for centuries, most predominantly 
in Machiavelli’s “The Prince” from the early 16:th century. Positivism was (and in 
many ways is) the dominant theoretical approach through the 20:th century and it 
is mostly in the last couple of decades that it has come under some serious 
criticism. Scientists who “stick” to the positivistic school tends to think of humans, 
and by extension states, as being rational entities that act as they do based on a 
kind of “rational choice” model where the cost of option A is compared to the cost 
of option B and the most cost effective choice prevails whether that cost is in terms 
or money, security or something else (Lebow, 2011, 1219-1221). 
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3.1.1 Realism and the International Security Model 
 
This chapter will try to explain how a realist would attempt to explain the reasons 
for a state like Iran to develop nuclear bombs.  Realism is not one unified theory 
but a large diverse body of different ideas and beliefs that have some important 
ideas in common, the most important of these common ideas (for the purpose of 
this paper) is the assumptions that a state is a single unified rational actor and that 
as such states will always act out of its own self-interest regardless of the political 
structure or the situation. In this paper I will focus mostly on neo-Realism (also 
referred to as structural Realism) as it is the approach that mostly discusses the 
concept of nuclear weapons and their importance in IR theory. Structural realist 
focus predominantly on the anarchic nature of the international system, as there is 
no central government in the international arena each state is forced to act in its 
own self-interest and protect itself from other states. Defensive structural Realism 
argue that states will seek to avoid wars by balance and will only amass enough 
force to be able to defend itself from its enemies while offensive structural realists 
argue that a state will always try to amass as much power as they possibly can to 
ensure safety (Williams, 2013, 18-22). 
Realism, in most of its variants, is a positivist theory and thus arguing that social 
science can and should be approached as if it were a natural since. The truth of the 
world is “out there” and we can find it if we simply study the right cases and 
observe the statistics of these cases. Realism came to predominance in 
International Relations studies in the inter-war years of the 20:th century as a 
critique to the Liberal ideas that many thought of as being far to idealistic and 
viewing the world as they wanted it to be rather than as it really was (Williams, 
2013, 15-16). Realists believe that the ultimate goal of a state is always to survive 
at any cost and thus care little for concepts such as moral or ethics although they, 
unlike some theories, generally does not deny the existence of such concepts only 
their relevance. 
States and their leaders engage in a series of calculations wherein they consider 
their aims for a war, the prospects for victory, and finally, and most importantly, 
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how the war will affect their attainment of security. The main purpose of nuclear 
weapons in realist theories is not to use them but rather as deterrence. The 
general idea of deterrence is to control or at least influence another party’s actions 
trough fear rather than direct actions, either through military or economical 
threats. It is often said that the ultimate form of deterrence is nuclear, as the fear 
of nuclear weapons and their destructive capability should by far outweigh any 
gain one could have from attacking the nation. Realists argue that a state will 
therefore try to get nuclear weapons when they have an enemy that they feel 
inferior (or at least not superior) to and cannot count on another country to 
protect them from that enemy (Shilling, 2008, 20-21).  According to realist models 
the Soviet Union started their nuclear program as a direct answer to the American 
as the cold War started and felt that US nuclear arsenal gave the Americans to 
great an advantage in the conflict for global dominance. UK and France feared 
Soviet advances in Europe and that they could not count on the US as they might 
be deterred by Soviet nukes and might not be prepared to start a nuclear war 
unless they themselves were threatened. After the Sino-Soviet split in the early 
60ies China could no longer count on the Soviet Union to help them and thus 
needed to protect themselves from both superpowers and in 1964 tested their first 
bomb which in turn made India, who fought a war with China in 1962 but had yet 
to pick a side in the cold war, to advance their own program. Israel was surrounded 
and outnumbered by its Arab enemies and after the Suez crisis in 1956 felt it could 
no longer count totally on US support. Lastly Pakistan felt threatened by India´s 
conventional and nuclear superiority. Nuclear weapons are thus a tool to respond 
to an existing treat or to change a status quo that one is uncomfortable with 
(Sagan, 1995, 58-59: Sagan and Waltz 2010, 90-91). 
The first and most important aspect of nuclear weapons for Iran, according to most 
realist theories, would probably be its problematic relations with Israel and the US 
(Waltz, 2012, 2-3). The US have been a nuclear power since 1945 and while Israel 
have never openly admitted to having nuclear weapons it is generally accepted 
that they have been a nuclear state since the late 1960ies (Allison and Zelkow 
1999, 25). Likewise Iran cannot match the conventional forces of the US or Israel in 
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case of war, should the problematic relations escalate further. Since the US 
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq the Iran government feels surrounded and 
isolated and the balance even further in their (potential) enemy's favors. Because 
of these facts it is reasonable, from a realist point of view, that Iran would want to 
find a means to ensure its own protection from its more powerful enemies, and to 
avoid total US hegemony of the Middle East region. 
Even before the strong US presence in Iraq and Afghanistan Iran´s history with both 
these countries was problematic as they had different religious views and strategic 
goals.  Having suffered Iraqi chemical weapons attacks in the 1980s, Iran was also 
concerned about the possible resumption of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction 
programs as it might give Saddam the courage to again attack Iran without fearing 
outside involvement, or might even use them against Iran (Sherrill 2012, 35-36). A 
nuclear deterrence would then be the most secure way of protection against their 
offensive neighbor. Another perhaps less significant but still important threat is the 
on-and-off problematic relations with Iran´s eastern neighbor Pakistan: with a 
population double that of Iran’s and a significant nuclear stockpile Pakistan is a 
close and potentially very significant threat to Iran. From a realist perspective Iran 
has more than enough reasons to make the decision to attempt to develop nuclear 
weapons especially in the light of George W Bush´s “Axis of Evil” speech in 2002 
and the different lessons learned from the examples of North Korea and Iraq: 
North Korea has nuclear weapons and was not invaded while Iraq did not and was 
(Sherrill 2012, 40). In the last few year Iran has tried to improve their relations with 
the nuclear powers Russia and China (Iran´s chef oil receiver) but not to the extent 
that they can feel conformable in their willingness or possibility to protect Iran in 
case of American hostility. Some realists, most predominately Kenneth Waltz, has 
argued that this is a good thing as the nuclear imbalance is one of the things that 
has made the Middle East such a problematic region in the last decades. Waltz 
argues that balance is a necessary condition for lasting peace and as long as Israel 
retained its nuclear monopoly there will never be balance. A nuclear Iran would 
therefore make Israel more cautious and more willing to engage in discussions with 
the Muslim countries. The risk would also be minimal as the MAD doctrine would 
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stop the states from ever using the nuclear weapons as it would lead to their own 
destruction (Waltz, 2012, 2-5) 
“If a country has nuclear weapons, it will not be attacked militarily in ways that threaten its 
manifestly vital interests. That is 100 percent true, without exception, over a period of 
more than fifty years.” (Waltz, 2007, 137) 
Other realists have a profoundly more negative view of the possibility of a nuclear 
Iran and their decision to make WMD:s. Many offensive structural realists argue 
that Iran will not stop at having nuclear weapons for their own protection from 
outside forces. Because the situation in the middle east is so complex and with so 
many fractions in the various countries: Iraq,  Syria, Afghanistan and even Pakistan 
rank among the most unstable states in the world at the “Failed State” index 
(http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/) and both in Syria and Afghanistan war still rages. If 
Iran could acquire nuclear weapons they could be considerable more active in the 
region without having to fear retaliation from Israel or the US as they would be 
unwilling to risk nuclear war. Supporters of this theory claims that Pakistan has 
become significantly more aggressive since they joined the nuclear club provoking 
the Kargil war and other incidents (Fitzpatrick, 2006, 530) and it is reasonable to 
assume that Iran would act in a similar fashion, increasing conventional military 
assistance to Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, as the nations 
have some similarities. This would potentially strengthen Iran’s power and 
simultaneously weaken its enemies. Some offensive realists however argue that 
the making of WMD: s is too dangerous for a nation like Iran as they risk offensives 
from Israel or the US to be solely for defensive reasons. 
Realism can thus give very different answers to why a state choses to make the 
attempt to make nuclear weapons but all of them come from the same reasoning 
of making a rational choice based on potential costs and benefits. If the potential 
benefits, whether for defensive or offensive intends, exceeds the costs of making 
the WMD than a state will attempt to do so. Based on your own version and 
interpretation of realist argument a realist could argue anything from direct 
invasion to simply let it happen when asked the question on how to tackle the 
problem of states such as Iran trying to make nuclear weapons. The only way to 
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truly discourage Iran from building nuclear weapons would be direct force or 
convincing Israel to dismantle their nuclear weapons and/or convince the US to be 
less active in the region, neither of which is very likely to happen.  
 
3.1.2 Liberalism and the Domestic Politics Model 
 
Liberalism is a set of theories that has been predominant in the western mind ever 
since the enlightenment in the 17:th and 18:th centuries. Liberalism takes its roots 
in the ideas of individual freedom and promotes ideas such as democracy and 
market economy to grant individuals as great amounts of freedom as possible. Like 
Realism, Liberalism is a positivist theory that focuses on “scientific” ideas in that 
the world can be observed and measured to gain knowledge and understanding on 
how the social world works. Arguably the best example of this is Francis 
Fukuyamas book “The End of History” that argued that the 20:th century offered 
empirical proof that Liberalism and liberal democracies was superior to all other 
ideologies and government forms (Baylis and Smith, 2008, 110-112). While 
Liberalism has some assumptions in common with Realism they are very different 
in their approach to international relations. Whereas Realism discards moral and 
(at least theoretically) seeks only to explain how the world works from their 
perspective Liberalism have strong opinions of right and wrong and seeks to 
encourage the spread and convince others that their own values are the right ones 
and that all nations should adopt a democratic government form as they argue 
that they are more peaceful than other variants. This is best exemplified in the 
“democratic peace theory” that states the liberal democracies never go to war 
against each other as there are no examples of this happening in the hundred or so 
years that modern democracies have existed. Liberals also argue that it is 
interdependences (that is mutually beneficial interaction) between states that is 
what creates good and stable relations rather than military alliances (Sagan, 1995, 
64). However while lack of democratic governments and interdependence can 
explain the background to why a state choses to develop nuclear weapons it 
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cannot answer why the specific decision was taken. To do so from a liberal point of 
view we can look at another thing they see very different from realists namely how 
a state works. As I mentioned in the realist section realists see the state as a single 
unified rational actor, while liberals agree that a state is rational they do not see it 
as a single unified unit but rather a complex structure of many different 
organizations with many varying interests leading to the so called “domestic policy 
model” to why states make a certain decision at a specific time (Smet, 2010, 14). 
Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is useful in building domestic support for the 
Islamist regime. Although not accountable to the people, the clerics nevertheless seek 
popular support in order to reduce the costs of ruling. (Sherrill, 2012, 41) 
 
The domestic policy model as the name suggests argue that it is not external 
threats bur rather domestic interests that determines if a state will go nuclear or 
not thou obviously domestic actors are influenced by external situations. Domestic 
models of proliferation contend that states seek nuclear weapons. Nuclear 
programs are, from this point of view, the result of an entity or coalition of groups 
within the state that sees nuclear weapons as a means to accomplish some 
domestic goal (Sherrill 2012). This is, liberal’s claim, the explanation why some 
states does not follow the direct path to nuclear weapons as Realism might predict. 
An example of this could be why France acquired nuclear weapons so long after 
the Soviet Union and the UK. The Soviet Union tested its first nuclear bomb in 1949 
and so could threaten western Europe with conventional war while hopefully 
keeping the US out with nuclear deterrence making the European nations feel the 
need for their own nuclear capability as security. The UK tested its first weapon in 
1952 but France not until 1960 despite being in the same situation, however 
France had suffered far more damage in World War II than the UK and thus could 
not motivate to spend the billions of dollars (mostly from the Marchall plan) on a 
nuclear program rather than rebuilding bombed cities and destroyed 
infrastructure. Such an investment would have been political suicide in a 
democratic county. Stalin’s Soviet Union however, despite suffering even more 
destruction than France, was not concerned with the opinions of the people and 
24 
 
the military as an organization had much greater influence. Even more peculiar, 
from a realist point of view, is the long (almost a decade) time between Chinas first 
nuclear test and India’s in 1974. India should definitely have had the economy and 
the nuclear know-how to create a nuclear device at least by the late 60ies if 
deterrence against china was their only concern. However several important 
groups in the Indian government opposed the nuclear program and instead 
wanted for India to join the NPT and while many others wanted to proceed with 
the nuclear program the actual decision was postponed until the pro-nuclear side 
won in the end. When the actual test was performed the reaction from the public 
was very positive and most Indians supported the decision to go nuclear (Sagan 
1996, 66-67). 
This model can also explain why some nations drop their nuclear ambitions totally 
such as Sweden or more noticeably South Africa who developed nuclear weapons 
in the 80s only to dismantle them at the end of the decade. The South African 
government supported the idea of nuclear weapon throughout the 70s and early 
80s but by the end of the decade had drastically changed their opinion as the 
apartheid regime in South Africa came under even greater criticism both from 
within and from the international community. In 1989, several months before the 
fall of the Berlin wall the South African government took the decision to dismantle 
the six nuclear weapons they had constructed and around the same time the 
discriminating laws were changed a bit. Liberals see this as an attempt by the 
existing regime to remain in power by making popular decisions to get internal 
support (Sagan, 1996, 69-71). 
In Iran the regime is not democratic and does not need the direct support or 
popularity of the people but must nonetheless be careful: the current regime in 
Iran was created by a revolution and it is not outside the realm of possibility that 
such a thing could happen again so ether the support of the people or the military, 
to keep the people in line, is important. 
Islam is the ideological foundation justifying the positions of the elite in Iran. 
Regime elites compete among themselves for power; yet, they are all dependent 
on the maintenance of the Islamic system for their positions. To what extent the 
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actual leaders in Iran are religious or is simply using religion as a tool has been 
questioned but they use the religion as a unifying force to bring the people 
together. Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is useful in building domestic support 
for the Islamist regime. Whether the leaders believe or not they are, however, 
stuck with using Islam as a base for their power as they cannot publicly repudiate 
that which provides the sole basis of their regime’s legitimacy (Sherrill, 2012, 42). 
 Although not accountable to the people, the leaders nevertheless seek popular 
support in order to reduce the costs and problems of ruling. By tying the 
construction of nuclear weapons to nationalistic pride the nuclear program can 
serve several important functions at once, especially in times of economic hardship 
and isolation. At the same time it can be a source of pride in their technological 
achievement and a way to alienate the people from western influence by 
demonizing the west as trying to deny the Iranians something that they have. 
Because of this observers have noted a strong support for the nuclear program 
from the Iranian people as they feel it is something they deserve. Developing 
nuclear weapons could also provide a clear, tangible achievement by which the 
regime leaders could justify the economic difficulties in Iran in the past years. By 
portraying the economic problems as sacrifices by the people to permit 
technological progress, the regime can reduce the level of criticism the economic 
problems can otherwise lead to. However if they fail, having invested large sums in 
the nuclear program, the regime would be hard-pressed to explain a lack of results. 
Because of this the bureaucratic momentum of the decade’s long program could 
also prove to be a driving force in the pursuit of nuclear weapons as failure at this 
point would potentially be disastrous for the regimes legitimacy (Smet, 2010, 29-
30). 
Institutionally the nuclear program is officially controlled by the civilian Atomic 
Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) but is de facto under the control of the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) a military organization that, officially, exists to 
protect the country's Islamic system but that has in the last years grown into a 
multi-billion dollar economic organization that has very great influence on the 
government (Sherrill, 2012, 40-41). As the IRGC has become more and more 
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important in Iran both economically and politically the nuclear program has 
become important and their resources have increased. For the IRGC the control of 
the nuclear program, both civilian and military, has become an important part in 
their own self-interest as their original purpose is very close to the regular military. 
Nuclear weapons would enhance IRGC power in the Iranian regime, guaranteeing 
that the IRGC will retain influence in the future, especially during possible 
uncertainties that might surround the succession of Supreme Leadership when he 
eventually dies. The great complexity of the Iran political system also helps the 
nuclear program as it becomes a way for different political organizations to gain 
support and advance their own interests on their rival’s expense. Some liberals 
also highlight the importance of certain individuals as they are the ones who make 
the ultimate decisions. Who is Supreme Leader and president matters as their 
cooperation and support is necessary to develop the nuclear sector. The 2013 
election of Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran is argued as one of the reasons for 
the agreement made in November 2013 between Iran and the P5+1 as he is more 
willing to cooperate than his predecessor. Others reject this explanation as the 
Supreme Leader remains the same and is the most important individual in Iranian 
politics (Sagan, 2011, 230). 
Liberalism gives a very different answer to why a state choses to start military 
nuclear program when compared to Realism. Like realist however they believe in 
the idea of rational actors weighing the options based on the cost of building or 
not building nuclear weapons. Few if any liberals would probably argue that a 
nuclear Iran (or any non-democratic state) is a good thing as isolated dictatorships 
with limited economic freedom is opposed to what liberals think is a good state. 
Thus to a liberal the question of who is developing nuclear weapons is essential to 
how one is to respond to it. Discouraging Iran to close their nuclear program would 
be most effectively achieved by increased interdependence and promotion of a 
greater respect for liberal democratic values within Iran and, failing that, propose 
economic sanctions to the point where developing nuclear weapons become so 
expensive that is not worth it. 
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3.2 Non-positivism  
 
Non-positivism is a broad set of theories that share the common concept that they 
reject positivism as a way of analyzing international relations. While positivists 
argue that social sciences should be approached in the same way as natural 
sciences non-positivists hold the belief that the observer can never be free of 
his/her own views and thus cannot be objective when analyzing social phenomena. 
You cannot understand international relations by preforming experiments as if you 
were analyzing the laws of physic. Instead knowledge comes from understanding 
humans and their actions and writings and trying to understand the minds of other 
humans. Non-positivism is not a unified concept and many of them agree with the 
ontology of positivism: that there is an objective truth but reject the idea that it 
can be objectively studied. Many other variants reject the ontology of positivists 
and deny the existence of any “real world” and believe that our social world is 
constructed by us and the discourse which we live with. Non-positivism generally 
reject the ideas that there are any universal values that are always right such as 
Liberal beliefs that democracies do not go to war against each other or Realist 
claims that states will always value its survival over all other thing. Non-positivism 
instead argues that all such ideas are socially constructed and therefore dependent 
on our individual and/or collective beliefs and experiences (Lebow, 2011, 1224-
1226).  
 
3.2.1 Constructivism and the Identity/Norms model 
 
Constructivism arose as a set of theories in the 80s and 90s as a critic to the 
standard theories of Liberalism and Realism believing that their positivistic 
approach to social science makes them focus too much on what can be easily 
measured empirically and ignore more subtle but equally as, or more, important 
aspects of social sciences. Constructivists argue instead that the world is 
constituted socially through inter-subjective interaction; that agents and 
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structures are mutually constituted; and that ideational factors such as norms and 
identity are central to the constitution and dynamics of world politics (Williams, 
2013, 64-65). Constructivism is sometimes considered a theoretical “middle 
ground” between positivists and non-positivist as constructivist often agree with 
the positivist epistemology that there is a “real world” but not the idea that this 
world can be observed  in any objective way and that as humans we are always to 
some extent colored by our own experience and beliefs (Björkdahl, 2002b, 25). 
Alexander Wendt famously claimed that “Anarchy is what States Make of it” as a 
response to Waltz explanation that international relation is a resolute of the 
anarchic international system. Wendt agreed that the international system was 
anarchic but rejected Waltz idea that this must lead to certain forgone conclusions 
in state behavior (Williams, 2013, 75-76).  
 
“Both social Constructivism and new institutionalism focus on norms concerning weapons 
acquisition, seeing nuclear decisions as serving important symbolic functions – shaping as 
well as reflecting a state’s identity and modernity” (Sagan, 1996, 73) 
 
Constructivists argue that international relations to a great extent are dominated 
by norms that are constantly being constructed and re-constructed as the 
dynamics in the world changes. Unlike realists who discards the relevance of moral 
or liberalists who believe in a set of never-changing moral values constructivists 
believe that morals are important but changes to reflect the changes in the world 
dynamics. Why, for example, was nuclear tests considered impressive and positive 
in the 50ies but is today very frowned upon even by the existing nuclear states? 
The norms and ideas surrounding nuclear weapons and their status has obviously 
changed in the last decades and many believe that the NPT and its broad support 
has changed how we view these things without any real “empirical” change 
(Sherrill, 2012, 45-46). Before the NPT was enforced in 1970 only the US and Soviet 
Union really tried to keep nuclear weapons from spreading by offering protection 
to their allies. Between 1970 and 2015 only four states developed nuclear 
weapons despite many having both the capability and the external reasons to do 
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so (for example South Korea). 
Despite this change in how nuclear weapons is perceived many states try to 
develop them as they are still perceived to have an important symbolic value to 
the states strength both in military and technological terms. It is a generally 
believed norm that you cannot be a great power without having nuclear weapons. 
 
“Norms help define goals and purposes of states. Although they do not establish clear 
policy options, they offer a general vision and direction and can be seen as providing the 
road maps for states’ foreign policy action, ‘since traditional international law provides 
governments with little guidance’.” (Björkdahl, 2002a, 22) 
 
Norms in international politics give states a goal and a way to reach that goal given 
their own view of how and where their place in the system is. Nuclear weapons is 
an important part of this as, since the cold war, they stand out as something that is 
closely connected to great-powers status and today many believe that you cannot 
be considered a real great power unless you possess nuclear weapons. The 
international norms of what a great power is and how to become one gives Iran 
the road map they need and a goal to aim for as they try to become a great-power. 
When talking about nuclear proliferation and Constructivism equally as important 
as norms is the concept of identity and the importance nuclear weapons has on a 
state’s identity (Nia, 2010, 150-152). 
This is important both as something to show the rest of the world but also to show 
the Iranian population to create a new identity. Constructivist models emphasize 
the symbolic importance leaders attach to nuclear arms. By acquiring nuclear 
capability, states hope to establish their identity as technologically advanced and 
independent powers deserving of special recognition. In short, states seek honor 
and prestige more than they seek any direct tangible benefits. Iran has long sought 
to play a leading role in the Persian Gulf region in particular and by extension the 
entire Muslim world. Iranian Islamists try to incorporate Persian nationalism into 
their brand of Islamism. Becoming the first nuclear capable Muslim nation in the 
Middle East would allow them to enhance their appeal to Muslims across the 
region, despite religious differences. Moreover, a nuclear weapons capability 
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would serve as a public symbol solidifying the independence of Iran from Western 
dominance, by proving that they are not afraid to develop nuclear weapons no 
matter what other states say (Nia, 2010, 178-180). This is also closely connected to 
the national pride of the people and a leader who can close or diminish the power 
gap between Iran and western states would gain a good reputation. This may 
seem similar in some ways to the domestic policy model as they both appeal to the 
nationalistic pride of the people but there are major differences as well: the 
domestic policy model is a rational choice model where the cost of possibility A is 
weighted against the cost of possibility B and the most efficient one is chosen, an 
identity that you try to create or project cannot be as easily put into an “economic 
value” as political support. Another major difference is that in the domestic policy 
model you try to gain something from someone in this case you try to project 
something to someone which can be a very significant difference. It is worth 
noticing however that from the identity point of view there is no real need for Iran 
to actually make an nuclear weapon as it is the technology to do so and the “guts” 
to develop the nuclear program when other tell you to stop that is the most 
important part. If you can show this without actually detonating a bomb it might 
actually be preferable since you won’t get as much negative reactions from others 
(Sherrill, 2012, 43). Given Iran’s current approach this seems an unlikely goal as 
they seem determent to weaponize their nuclear program and wants to challenge 
the global norms of a western dominated world (Hymans & Matthew, 2013, 33). 
To fully understand why Iran wants to create nuclear weapons many 
constructivists would argue that you need to understand the history and its great 
importance to how a state and its inhabitants view themselves when compared to 
other states (Nia, 2010 161-162). Iran generally starts its history telling with to the 
Achaemenid dynasty ruling the area from ca 550 b.c to 330 b.c (in European 
history telling generally referred to as the first Persian Empire). At 8 million km² it 
was by far the geographically largest empire the world had seen at the time and 
would keep that record for well over a thousand years.  Following a short period 
under Hellenistic rulers Iran raised again as a great power under first the Parthian 
and then the Sasanian (Sassanid) dynasties (sometimes called the neo-Persian 
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empire). For centuries the Iranian Shah was the primary rival of the Roman 
Emperors and was the major power in Western Asia.  These long millennia of 
great-power statuses have been important in shaping the national identity of the 
modern Iran and it´s natural status as a regional power (Nia, 2010, 160-162). With 
this historical background it is understandable that Iran wants to establish itself as 
the leader of the Muslim world and is unwilling to face the current political reality 
that this is not the case. The need to change this identity from that of a small state 
to a large one becomes a fundamental part in understanding Iran’s choices and the 
path that Iran walks.  
 
“Iran suffers from a status discrepancy: a gap between its own and others' perceptions of 
its importance. It wants to sit at the top table with the big boys, not be relegated to dining 
with its smaller rivals in the Gulf.” (Chubin, 2014, 76). 
 
This gap, and the importance of closing it, has become a fundamental part of the 
politics of the Iranian government and the nuclearization in both the civilian and 
military sector is an important part of this. Nuclear energy and nuclear weapons 
are here seen as the ultimate proof of a state’s technological and military strength 
even thou neither will in any strict empirical way change the current situation of 
Iran to any great degree (Chubin, 2014, 65-66). From this point of view it is easy to 
understand why Iran should want nuclear weapons to prove their importance in 
the international system and as long as nuclear weapons are associated with great 
power it is unlikely that they would not want them. Becoming the first nuclear 
Muslim state in the Middle East would be an important step in taking a leading 
position in the region and among Muslims in general.  This puts Iran in great 
contrast to other states with completely different identities and goals. For example 
Japan has the capability to develop nuclear weapons and is/was close to potential 
threats like China and the Soviet Union but has never made any attempt to make 
nuclear weapons, a constructivist could argue that this is because of guilt since 
WWII and the importance of creating a new non-military identity since then. For 
constructivist the importance of socially constructed norms and identities are most 
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vital to understand (Chubin, 2014, 87-88). To tackle the problem of a state 
developing nuclear weapons it is therefore these norms that must be understood 
and countered, something that is difficult but not impossible since it has definitely 
happened in the past. One way to discourage Iran’s nuclear ambitions from this 
point of view could be to offer them something else that gives them international 
prestige (Sagan 2011, 240). A theoretical (but practically impossible) example of 
this could be a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council something 
that would recognize any state as an important one. 
 
3.2.2 Feminism and the Hyper-masculinization Model 
 
While Feminism has existed as a theoretical framework for a long time, dating back 
to the writings of people like Nicolas de Condorcet and Mary Wollstonecraft in the 
late 18th-century, it is only in the last couple of decades that Feminism has made a 
significant impact in the field of international relations (Williams, 2013, 108-109). 
Feminism is a wide set of theories with a lot of differences but with the common 
idea of analyzing international politics through the lens of gender. While there are 
exceptions most feminists (at least in international relations) are non-positivistic, 
focusing a lot on understanding gender as a social construct or the importance of 
the discourse of gender.  Like most theoretical approaches Feminism have a lot of 
variations and what is presented here is only one way of looking at this question 
from a feminist perspective but one I think offers an interesting insight. Feminists 
argue that the fundamental, perceived, differences between men and women 
effect, not only national but also international politics as it changes our look on 
reality and how we perceive the world around us. These differences are connected 
to the fundamental difference between sex and gender and the importance of 
understanding what these differences imply (Kirby, 2012, 779). While the exact 
differences between sex and gender is a very fascinating topic it is slightly outside 
the perimeter of this paper so suffice to say is that sex is a biological function while 
gender is a social construct where you connect certain attributes with certain 
genders (slightly simplified). Feminists argue that in international politics there is a 
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structure that places masculinity over femininity (Kirby, 2012, 780–801).  This can 
be seen as a direct critique towards the dominance of neo-realist theories who 
deny any structures and base their arguments on the assumption that the 
international system is almost completely anarchic. Feminists argue that gender is 
an important structure in the international system as there are some specific 
attributes and characteristics that are connected to masculinity and that these 
characteristics are generally considered positive and associated with strength while 
characteristics associated with femininity are seen as negative and connected to 
weakness. Characteristics such as courage, aggressiveness, determination and 
decisiveness are among those generally associated with masculinity (Sjoberg, 2013, 
62). 
The associations of these characteristics are very important to understand as they 
to a great degree dictates the actions of governments and their leaders. It is 
fundamental from this point of view to understand gender as a structure in 
international relations as without understanding gender we cannot understand 
how and why states act as they do. By placing masculine characteristics over 
feminine characteristic as a structure it will guide states to act in a way that is 
perceived as being masculine and avoid any action that might lead to other 
perceiving you as feminine as such characteristics are “weak”. This has led to a 
state of masculine hegemony in the world.  As with the case of constructivists 
feminists argue that states are guided by values and norms that give certain goals 
and paths towards these goals but contribute these norms to a historical and 
special consistent structure of masculinity over femininity (Kirby, 2012, 820–821). 
This hierarchy in gender is easily observed by analyzing the language used in 
international politics and conflicts. In the cases of both the Afghanistan and Iraq 
war the rhetoric of protecting women and children from the oppressive state 
connecting the war to (positive) masculine chivalry. Likewise when describing 
others committing horrible acts gender- biased language such as the “rape of 
Nanjing” in 1937-38 is often used. Weakness in states are often describes with 
word such as impotence or “spreading its legs” noting a lack of masculine strength 
(Sjoberg, 2013, 101). One of the most obvious example of such a language is the 
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Indian Hindu nationalist Balasaheb Thackeray who explained “we had to prove that 
we are not eunuchs” when asked about the 1998 nuclear weapon tests. Once 
Pakistan had tested nuclear weapons India had to do the same or seem “unmanly”. 
This kind of language is more important than simply being a choice of word as the 
way we think and act are reflected in the way we express ourselves and to use this 
kind of language helps to keep and expand the gender hierarchy in the human 
mind and makes states continue to act after a certain pattern (Williams, 2013, 
116). 
By valuing masculine characteristics highly states will act in a way to try and 
achieve and project these values towards other states. The honor of a state 
becomes very important and a state will do a lot of decisions based on the simple 
objective of trying to protect or enhance that honor. This can easily lead to a state 
trying to become more and more “masculine” and act in ways that are perceived to 
be masculine leading to a stage of hypermasculinization. This is not limited to, or 
even mostly associated with, actions but also with the general discourse in a state 
and how that state changes to perceive itself and its honor. A state with a strong 
hypermasculine discourse will be more likely to be aggressive and competitive 
(Sjoberg, 2013, 100-102) when compared to a state with a more gender-neutural 
discourse. This helps explain why states in similar situations can act very differently 
from each other. It is worth noticing that feminists generally don’t believe that men 
(as a sex) are more aggressive than women but rather that aggressiveness as a 
characteristic is associated with masculinity (as a gender) and therefore often seen 
as a proof of strength. Developing nuclear weapons would in many cases be a very 
strong step in preserving ones masculinity and defending ones honor (Duncanson 
and Eschle, 2008, 551). Seen as the ultimate show of military strength and power 
nuclear weapons becomes naturally connected to masculine power and potency 
(that they, or rather the missiles they are attached to, are phallic-shaped only 
highlights the symbolism). A state with a hypermasculine discourse would 
therefore benefit a lot from nuclear weapons, especially in a case where an 
aggressive military policy is not preferable for some reason. The discourse in Iran is 
very much one of masculinity where strength and aggressiveness are seen as the 
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way to deal with external problems. Legally speaking, women in Iran are not as 
discriminated as in many nearby sates but are nonetheless systematically denied 
many possibilities (as in the case with the president post mentioned earlier) often 
with motivations as not being “strong” enough for the task (Kirby, 2012, 810). 
Iran´s dominant masculine discourse is a fundamental part of the desire to develop 
nuclear weapons (this can be in contrast to states with a less extreme masculine 
discourse where the idea of developing nuclear weapons have not been as notable 
especially in the post-cold war era).  
“A dominant hypermasculinity in the international system structure would lead states to 
approximate hypermasculinity in their functions, search for capabilities, and interaction 
with one another (Sjoberg, 2013, 101).” 
In the case of Iran it can be especially important given its troubled relation to the 
United States and other nations. Hypermasculinity here becomes a reaction to a 
threat or an uncertainty when interacting with the western world and potential 
conflicts. 
“… sometimes, a state´s hegemonic masculinity becomes reactionary or “hypermasculine” 
in response to feeling threatened or undermined…” (Sjoberg 2013, 89) 
In fear of suffering the same fate that Iraq suffered an increased masculine 
discourse, especially among the leaders who fears being perceived as feminine and 
therefore weak, has emerged. Femininity becomes synonymous with being 
incapable of protecting the country and its inhabitants and as such deeply 
connected with the honor of the state. This increased masculine discourse makes 
the development of nuclear weapon all the more symbolically important as a sign 
of masculine power. Iran´s regime develops nuclear weapons as a sign of their 
potency but also as a very real demonstration of power and strength. Another 
important factor to take in account is the concept of honor as connected to women 
and femininity. Women are often seen as the keepers of a states honor and it is the 
ultimate failure of a state to be incapable of defending that honor (which is why 
wartime rape is seen as such a disgrace both for the person in question and the 
state as a hole) (Kirby, 2012, 815). Comparing the geographic borders of a state to 
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a woman’s body and to have that body “penetrated” by another state is seen as 
the ultimate form of shame. In a situation where a conflict with the west and the 
US becomes a reality (as was the case in Iraq) having nuclear weapons is seen as 
the only possible way to defend that honor given the vast military inferiority that 
Iran has. As such nuclear weapons becomes very important both on a symbolic but 
also on a strictly practical level, as a necessity to defend the state (Duncanson and 
Eschle, 2008, 545-546). From a feminist point of view a state’s decisions, such as 
whether to develop nuclear weapons, is not a question of what is the most logical 
or economical thing to do but rather guided by a gendered structure of norms and 
ideas. By following the discourse that exist in the world today some choices 
becomes a necessity in certain situations and a state with a very gendered 
discourse like Iran walks a certain path. Discouraging a state in such a condition can 
be almost impossible as they are stuck in a discourse that is not easily changed 
(Duncanson and Eschle, 2008, 561-563).  
 
3.2.3 Political Psychology and the Ontological security Model 
 
Political Psychology is a relatively young field in International relations and as the 
name implies it seeks to explain political changes and events by looking at the 
human psychology rather than at external factors in the decision making process. 
Human are motivated by emotions and the inner workings of the human brain. 
Political Psychology can be approached from both a positivistic point of view, 
(focusing on the human nature and natural reactions of the human brain) and non-
positivistic point of view (focusing on how our emotions are affected by our 
subjective impressions and personal opinions and experiences) (Hymans, 2006, 
460-462). In this article I will mostly focus on the non-positivistic branch. Within 
Political Psychology the relationship between politics and psychology is considered 
bi-directional, with psychology being used as a lens for understanding politics and 
politics being used as a lens for understanding psychology. Political Psychology also 
highlights the importance of leadership and who people will follow under what 
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circumstances. As Political Psychology focuses on the human mind it is important 
to understand the reasoning of individuals, primarily, but by no means only, the 
leaders of states. A leader who can “read” and affect the current psychological 
“sense” of the people will be more successful than others who try to lead. This is 
very important as leaders can manipulate these feelings to further their own goals. 
An important addition to the international relations debate that Political 
Psychology has “introduced” is the concept of Ontological Security and its effects 
on the decision making process not only of leaders but of a state as a hole.  
”Ontological security is security not of the body but of the self, the subjective 
sense of who one is, which enables and motivates action and choice”. (Mitzen, 2006, 344) 
 
As the quote explains ontological security is the importance of feeling safe in one’s 
own identity and beliefs. This can include things like nationalism and religion: 
identities that many feel are threatened in an increasingly globalized and 
secularized world. This is in some way similar to the view of constructivists as they 
both focus strongly on the importance of identity on an individual and national 
level. However there is an important difference in that constructivists focus mostly 
on the identity you project (or a new identity you want to project) outwards to 
others wile political psychologists focus on preserving an existing identity inwards. 
This difference is importance as the driving factor here is fear rather than pride or 
a want for more. Some political psychologists have talked about a “memory boom” 
in the world since the end of the cold war. With the collapse of the bipolar 
international system a greater interest has risen for the collective memories of the 
people as an incitement for politics (Gustafsson, 2014, 71-72). This has given rise to 
changes in both internal politics such as increased nationalism and religious 
traditions and external politics such as remembering pre-cold war conflicts. This 
“memory boom” makes the concept of ontological security all the more important 
as the driving forces behind it becomes clearer.  
 In this context globalization becomes a problematic, destabilizing force in the 
international community something that is in strong contrast to the classic liberal 
view of globalization as something good and beneficial for all involved parties. This 
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is because of the strong western dominance in the globalization process and the 
strong spread of values with their origins in the west. By bringing cultures closer 
and closer to each other the “stronger” cultures have a great effect on the 
“weaker” and changes them (sometimes purposefully and sometimes not). Many 
people in other cultures feel that the western world is to an increasing degree 
spreading their values and by extension culture at the expense of their own 
cultures (Kinnvall 2004, 745). This is especially dominant in the former western 
colonies since they already have a strong cultural legacy of enmity and fear 
towards the west. They fear that they will lose their own identities. To lose ones 
ontological security will lead to a sense of having lost the stability and security that 
your life was based on and make you unsecure of what the future holds. This can 
make people easier to “manipulate” by leaders as they feel lost and need 
something to cling to.  
“It is at such times of “homelessness” and alienation that leaders may emerge to channel 
existential fears and feelings of loss and despair “(Kinnvall 2004, 763) 
 
This fear is becoming especially significant in states that are generally considered 
“enemies” of the West and especially enemies of America. In these state the fear 
becomes more predominant because of the significant difference in strength and 
influence in the world making the fear of losing your ontological security all the 
more tangible as you are aware that you are already in a distinctive inferior 
position. This fear helps to create a further wedge between different cultures that 
makes the existing enmity even more predominant (Kinnvall 2004, 751). Iran most 
definitely fits this description as the relations between Iran and the more powerful 
nations of the west have become increasingly bad ever since the revolution in 
1979. This has only increased because of the many economic sanctions that have 
been forced upon Iran by Western powers that mostly strike at the population 
making the people feel targeted by foreign powers (Hymans, 2006, 456-457). 
Nationalism and religious fundamentalism have become important aspects of 
Iran´s politics over last couple of decades and fear of losing their identity becomes 
more predominant with these factors as the identification with the nation-state 
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grows stronger. 
It is under these circumstances that it is becoming increasingly possible and even 
preferable for Iran’s leadership to do something to make the people feel that they 
are fighting for their ontological security, and making a stance towards the west is 
an essential part of this. From this point of view the development of nuclear 
weapons can be used as a kind of psychological defense against other nations 
imposed ideas. Nuclear weapons symbolizes Iran´s attempt to make a stand 
against foreign pressure and at the same time represents a kind of “only possible 
defense” in a way similar to how realists se weapons of mass destruction but with 
the focus on the psychological and ontological effects of their deterrence rather 
than on any actual military capacity that they may grant the state (O’Reilly, 2012, 
780-781). Note that the ontological security that Nuclear Weapons may grant can 
be very different for the leadership of the state and for the general population as a 
whole. The psychological effect of having some way to defend yourself can be very 
great and the length you are willing to go to achieve it is also great. This explains 
why economic sanctions has so far proved ineffective (and some would even argue 
counter-productive) in discouraging states like Iran and North Korea from 
developing nuclear weapons. 
The significance of Ontological Security becomes even more apparent when 
looking at Iran´s neighboring country Pakistans and their long and complex 
relations with India and their own history of acquiring nuclear weapons. Pakistan 
nuclear program started during the cold war and became very important in the 
mid 70ies after the disastrous war with India in 1971 in which Pakistan lost its 
eastern half (modern Bangladesh) and India’s first nuclear test in 1974. Ever since 
the original split between the two countries in 1949 Pakistan has suffered from a 
kind of inferiority complex towards its larger neighbor and adversary. India is 
undoubtedly larger, has a greater population, more natural resources, richer and 
had proven to be military superior in the 1971 conflict. According to many political 
psychologists this inferiority complex “forced” Pakistan and its leaders to compete 
with India on any field they could and nuclear weapons being both symbolically 
and military enormously powerful was such a field leading famously to the 
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Pakistan leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto clamming that Pakistan would get nuclear 
weapons even if the population had to “eat grass and leaves” something that was 
not considered “wrong” by the majority of the Pakistani people (O’Reilly, 2012, 
777). This can become a kind if psychological compulsion, where you need to act in 
a way that is often completely illogical and at any cost. Political psychologists 
argue that you only reach this level of compulsion when you feel that it is more 
than your physical safety that is at stake but rather your way of life. This fear can 
drive a people, not only their leaders, to go to any extreme to reach their goal 
(Mitzen, 2006, 351). 
Iran´s desire for nuclear weapons becomes an important reminder of the problems 
that the world faces as globalization spreads across the world. To halt this process 
is difficult as the process of globalization is already so integrated in the 
international political and economic system that it is unlikely to disappear. To 
discourage states from trying to develop nuclear weapons lies in recognizing and 
dealing with the real structural insecurities for many people in the more complex 
global world (O’Reilly, 2012, 770-771). The emotional and psychological effects of 
globalization and one cultures impact on another must be taken into account in all 
global interactions to avoid problems like the Iranian nuclear program. 
 
4 Analyzes  
These different theories and models offer a very great variety of explanations to 
why a state makes the decision to try and build nuclear weapons and how to best 
tackle the problem of nuclear proliferation. Iran is a very interesting case as all the 
models bring a very clear perspective given Iran´s unique political structure and 
interesting place in international position, both geographically and culturally. 
There are probably few political scientists of any alignment that does not to some 
level agree that all of these theories have made some valid points and that they all 
help to explain why states build nuclear weapons although they vary greatly in 
what is the most important part. The most significant difference lies in how the 
models answers the question of how to meet that decision and how to respond to 
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states trying to create nuclear weapons. Discarding for the moment the question if 
Iran really wants nuclear weapons (I will get back to that) the way to discourage 
them from walking such a path is very different for the supporters of the different 
models. The most fundamental difference is the one between positivists and non-
positivist or the argument between a rational choice and a decision guided by 
more abstract reasoning than simple mathematics as mean of explanation. But this 
is also simplifying the debate on the issue and many people can reach very similar 
conclusions based on very different starting points and reasoning. Liberals and 
Political Psychologists share a similar view on the great importance of individuals 
in the explanations (compared to others such as realists and constructivists) but 
reach that conclusion in very different ways. Many using these models would 
argue that the agreement between the P5+1 and Iran reached in November 2013 
would not have been possible if not for the victory Hassan Rouhani in the Iranian 
election or if the Bush administration had still ruled in the US (Senn and Elhardt, 
2014, 320-321). Others, most predominantly realist, reject this idea arguing that 
the negotiations are instead dominated by events outside the control of any 
individual or group of individuals.  
For a long time Realism was (and to a great extent still is) by far the most 
dominant of the various models, if not within the academia then at least in media 
and political debates, of explanation as it fits very well with the general ideas of 
the cold war and how other states reacted to the bipolar world of the US and 
Soviet Union. Realism is also nice in its simplicity in seeking the reasons for 
everything back to the very basic explanation of surviving something everyone can 
understand and relate to on some level. Realisms focus on deterrence provides a 
very simple explanation why Iran, like so many states before it wants the nuclear 
bomb to keep its enemies from attacking. Because of its dominance Realism is also 
by far the most criticized of the models as many feel that it simplifies the world to 
such an extreme degree that it does not give any real satisfying explanations at all. 
Non-positivist argue that the total focus on empirical explanations such as external 
threats limits the understanding as other factors play a greater role in 
understanding state actions. Humans are directed more by our desires and our 
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subjective beliefs than empirical “truths” such as military strength or GDP 
measurements. Norms and discourses are instead argued to be the explanations to 
why states act as they do and the problems one must focus on when analyzing 
situations like the one with the Iran nuclear debate. Realist deny that these things 
in the end have any real importance and when it comes down to it a state will 
always think of its own survival and discard any other goals or incitements such as 
norms or structures. As long as the international system is anarchic the state 
cannot afford to think or act in any other way. These great differences make 
Realism and other theories very hard to combine in any meaningful way. However 
this does not mean that they don’t have anything to offer each other in terms of 
intellectual understanding. In political science it is common to talk about three 
levels of analysis: System, Domestic and Individual levels. The System level focuses 
on explaining things by looking at the system in between states and the entire 
international arena as a hole. Domestic, or state level focuses on the internal 
political system of a state (such as democracy or dictatorship) and how that 
explains the states actions. Individual level seek to find the answers in the 
behavior of individuals. While most agree that all these level have some 
importance different theories focuses more on some and less on others. 
Realists focus almost only on the system layer and can as such offer some level of 
understanding on that level even to theories that generally focuses more on other 
levels. Even if you generally believe that states are mostly guided by individuals 
and their personal beliefs, an understanding of how the system can play a role in 
the decision making process can still ad further layers to your understanding or at 
least offer a contradicting view that is worth keeping in mind.  
To fully understand nuclear proliferation it is important to ask ourselves, not only 
why some states make the decision to develop nuclear weapons, but also why 
some states chooses not to do so. What are the differences between a state like 
Sweden, who had a nuclear program but shut it down in 1968, Japan, who never 
tried to build nuclear weapons despite having every opportunity to do so, South 
Africa, who did acquire nuclear weapons only to dismantle them a few years later, 
and North Korea, who did develop them despite enormous international pressure 
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to stop their nuclear program? All the models give their own version of what 
differences makes states act the way they do. The case of South Africa is very 
interesting here as it is the only state to make first the decision to build nuclear 
weapons and then make the decision to unmake then. From the International 
security model perspective this can be very hard to explain as there are no 
incitement for a state not to have nuclear weapons save perhaps the cost of 
developing them compared to the deterrence they provide. While South Africa 
had few direct external threats it can still be reasoned that during the cold war the 
communist threat was present enough to justify building nuclear weapons from a 
realist point of view but why they would dismantle them while the possibility of 
external threats exist is harder to answer as they are not particularly expensive to 
keep. Other theories offer a lot more of an explanation to this problem as they can 
focus more on the effects in a state. A liberal would argue that the change in South 
African internal politics came with the fall of the Apartheid regime and the cost of 
international pressure was what lead to the decision. In this case Realism and 
Liberalism can be used to complement each other as they offer different 
explanations but based on a similar world view, South Africa built nuclear weapons 
when they had a potential threat and an internal political situation and destroyed 
them when they had served their purpose and no internal support existed any 
more. Constructivists and Feminists would probably agree that the fall of the 
Apartheid system is key to understanding the changes in South Africa’s policy but 
focus more on the need to change their identity and their discourse to 
compensate for the changes in the rest of the world. As the norms on nuclear 
weapons become more and more negative keeping them became a political 
liability even before the final abolishment of the Apartheid system in 1994. Note 
that none of dese theories directly contradict each other and can be used as 
complements to understand the question even thou they focus on different 
aspects. 
The point where the models directly do contradict each other is on the subject of 
how to respond to a new state trying to join the nuclear club.  The positivistic 
theories focus on direct actions such as military threats or economics sanction as 
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indirect actions such as referring to the NPT or simply discussing the subject with 
the country at hand (in this case Iran) as this gives no real incitement for Iran to 
comply unless they really want to. Many Political Psychologists argue that this is 
not only ineffective but actually causes more damage than good as forcing Iran 
into a confrontation will only make them more isolated and more and more 
dependent on their ontological security as a sign of stability and security for the 
people making their incitement to resist western influence by developing and 
possibly constructing nuclear weapons. Instead the focus should be on trying to 
close the cultural and political gap between Iran and the West by closer 
cooperation and interaction. Liberals would agree that a closer interdependence 
would help but focus more on the economic aspects of this than cultural or 
psychological aspects. This again shows some similarities and some arguably more 
profound differences between Liberalist and Political Psychologists as they both 
believe that increased interaction is very important to avoid international conflicts 
but reach very different conclusions where Liberals seek to make everyone in the 
world accept a certain set of values and ideas (liberal democratic market-
economies) whereas Political Psychologists seek to increase interaction as a means 
of accepting differences and promote understanding of others way of thinking and 
thereby limit the “us vs them” mentality. This is however not as mutually exclusive 
as it might initially seem: cultural ideas and beliefs can spread in more subtle and 
often more effective ways in cases where understanding and acceptance rather 
than coercion or economic pressure is predominant methods of interaction 
(O’Reilly, 2012, 785). If “we” want Iran to become more democratic a more 
accepting policy might be more effective than economic sanctions. 
So far I have worked under the premises that Iran definitely wants nuclear 
weapons and discarded the discussion if this really is the case. As in this paper Iran 
is simply an example I feel this is reasonable but I still think that the arguments 
behind this assumption is worth mentioning. The Iran government have repeatedly 
denied any desire for nuclear bombs claiming that their nuclear program is for 
strictly civilian (energy) purposes. In 2005 the Supreme Leader issued a Fatwa 
(Muslim religious law) against the use, production or stockpiling of nuclear 
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weapons claiming them forbidden in accordance with the Koran. A Fatwa is 
considered binding precedent by those Muslims who have bound themselves to 
that scholar, in this case all if Iran.  Iran’s government uses this religious rhetoric as 
an argument that they do not want nuclear weapons. There has been three main 
counter argument that has been put forward depending on different ideas of 
Iran´s government.  The first is simply the idea that the Iran ruler don’t really care 
at all about religion, and/or Fatwas, but simply uses it as a cover to try and 
persuade others of their opinions and convictions. A realist would probably argue 
that it doesn’t at all mater if the Iran leaders are religious or not as in the long run 
they can’t afford to let the reactions be determent by anything less than the idea 
of their own survival. People who deny this have argued that when Iraq used 
chemical weapons in the 80-88 war, Iran did not respond in kind despite having 
the possibility to do so and a potential threat to their survival existed, and instead 
remained true to their religious convictions. Others, primarily non-positivists, 
argue that while Iran and its leaders are definitely religious Muslims there are 
ways in with you can circumvent the Fatwa and still remain true to their fate. One 
such escape is the concept of taqiyya. The concept of taqiyya is that a Muslim can 
be allowed to use lies to conceal his fate if his life is threatened and that this can 
be applied to the entire state of Iran and thus can the leaders be allowed to lie if 
they believe they are threatened. Another argument focuses on the possibility of 
by-pass the Fatwa by using the idea that Muslim laws and morals can be set aside 
if Islam itself is threatened by some external or internal force, this kind of 
reasoning have been used by terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda to motivate their 
actions claiming that the US and the entire western world has declared war on 
Islam worldwide. Counterarguments to this has been that the Fatwa against 
nuclear weapons is directly supported in the Koran and thus Gods law that cannot 
be circumvented.It is worth noticing that the IAEA has never directly accused Iran 
of trying to create nuclear weapons only of lacking in transparency in their nuclear 
program (Mousavian, 2013, 149-151). 
A strong contrast in the ideas of positivists and non-positivists is the outlook on 
Iran´s religious beliefs and if these are important parts of why they would want 
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nuclear weapons. A realist would strictly argue that they are not while a feminist 
would argue that it is, as the religion is fundamental in forming the general ideas 
of people. Like most religions Islam is in many ways a conservative institute 
promoting traditional values and morals including family structures. As such a 
strong Muslim identity will help in forming a masculine discourse where man and 
manliness is considered preferable. That’s not to say that Islam in itself is 
necessarily misogynic but rather that it promotes remaining in a culture/society 
that has misogynic tendencies. Another point of interest that separates the 
different models is the importance of the internal political structure. Iran has a 
very complex political system with lots of different organizations and institutions 
that does not necessarily always agree. Like I have mentioned before liberals 
believe that it is very important to understand their institutions and the various 
rivalries within the state. Others, especially realists but also some non-positivists, 
deny that internal structure have any deep significance at all as states actions are 
dominated by external threats or international norms respectively. Feminists and 
political psychologists are often somewhere in-between as they often argue that 
the political structure effects how people think and reason on an 
emotional/psychological level but is not necessarily as important as other factors 
such as culture or ontological security. 
Another very important difference in theories is how change in a state can and, 
perhaps more importantly, should be achieved: from outside or from within. Many 
positivists (and some non-positivists) argue that change should be imposed on a 
country by the international community and results can best be achieved through 
interaction and if that fails direct actions. This is very much the current norm in 
international relations and the talks between Iran, the IAEA and the P5+1 is a good 
representation of this idea. The talks are focusing on how to change Iran and the 
main method used are economic sanctions and to some extent military threats. 
Many post-positivists, and some positivists, reject this idea and instead argue that 
if Iran is to experience any real, lasting change in its view on the nuclear front it 
must come from within the state itself. Whether they believe that the main 
problem is ontological security, hypermasculinity or a demand for prestige is the 
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most important problem, they argue that these are ideas that cannot be forcibly 
changed by someone else but only by addressing the fundamental issues behind 
the want for nuclear weapons. The problem with this view is naturally how to 
change these fundamental issues without coming back to the problem of forcing 
our ideas upon someone else. Another problem can be the limited time frame, 
changing the basic ideas of a state, or the entire international community, can take 
time, and time is not always something you can spare (depending on your view if 
what the goal is).  
No matter which model you believe is the most important or does best analyze the 
situation in Iran, most people would probably agree that to discourage a state like 
Iran from developing nuclear weapons will be difficult at best or at the worst 
downright impossible. Whether they feel threatened by Israel´s nukes, Western 
cultural influence, international political insignificants or perceived feminine 
weakness it will be hard to convince the Iranian rulers that this is not the case and 
that nuclear weapons is not a necessity. Of course this doesn´t mean that there is 
no point in trying to dissuade states like Iran from developing nuclear weapons. 
Only by discussions can we reach the further understanding that is necessary to 
make any attempt to solve the problem.  
 
4.1 Conclusions 
 
So far I have in this paper been, or at least tried to be, impartial and only look at 
the different models without actually favoring any one of them. In this part I will 
now present my own ideas and opinions on what theory and model is the best and 
my take on the situation of Iran´s nuclear agenda. Lastly I will say a few words on 
the general debate concerning nuclear weapons and proliferation. 
 
I think that all the theories have their strengths and weaknesses and all of them 
bring something to the table if one wants to understand international relations, 
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but some of them I feel give a deeper and more fundamental understanding. 
Realism is nice in its simplicity but the total focus on external threats and not on 
any internal situations makes it problematic. Realists can generally give a 
reasonable explanation to why a state develop nuclear weapons but is not as good 
in explaining why some states do not want them or why states develop them at a 
specific time.  For example realists tend to argue that France decided to get 
nuclear weapons after the Suez crises when they realized that they could not 
count on the US to always to support them. While this makes sense it begs the 
question why other states did not react? Why for example did not Japan or South 
Korea come to the same conclusion as they also must have realized that being 
allied with the US dose not guaranty that the US would always help them? They 
both had the incitements (external threats) and at least by the mid 60ies the 
economic ability to do so yet neither did. Similarly all positivistic theories simplify 
the problem by only looking at the obviously observable factors when analyzing 
international politics and thereby risk missing things that are not easily 
quantifiable. Humans are not perfectly rational and objective entities that can 
always be assumed to make rational choices. However this does not mean that it is 
necessary or desirable to completely discard empirical research as a way of 
analyzing political events. Positivistic analyses can give great understanding in 
general trend in world politics and sometimes knowing what these trends are can 
be every bit as important as understanding the exact reasons behind them, at least 
at first.  
 
Personally I believe that the constructivist norms and identity models is the best of 
the models for understanding why Iran, or any other state, would want to develop 
nuclear weapons. This is because I believe it, more than any of the other models, 
explain why some states develop nuclear weapons while others don’t, despite 
similar situations as well as similar political or cultural conditions. The importance 
of a state’s sense of identity, and how that identity interacts with international 
norms, is in my opinion vital for understanding state behavior. International norms 
can explain why we can see some important general trends in the international 
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system and a states (perceived) identity can explain why some states do not follow 
the norms but rather try to break them. The rise of the NPT regime as an 
international norm in the late 60ies is very interesting as it very swiftly changed 
the general look on nuclear weapons from something if not positive than at least a 
state’s internal affair to something very negative causing major international 
objections. This change is hard to explain by using the other models and I think 
very important to understand when looking at why some states want nuclear 
weapons and some don’t. Like I mentioned above Iran wants to be one of the “big 
players” in the Middle East but lacks the economic and military power to become 
that as it is. Nuclear weapons therefore become a good way of increasing their 
national prestige and at the same time show their disdain for western dominated 
international norms. If you compare that to Sweden, who had a nuclear program 
from 1945 to 1968, you see a strict difference in how international norms affect 
countries with different identities. Sweden views itself as a peaceful and 
responsible member of the international community and when the NPT regime 
became predominant in the mid 60ies it was natural for Sweden to accept it rather 
than to continue its nuclear ambitions and was among the original states that 
signed it and has not made any further attempts to make nuclear weapon despite 
the possibility of doing so. This does not mean that Sweden care any less for its 
international prestige than Iran does but rather that the different identities make 
them react differently to existing international norms. This I think give the 
norms/identity model a strength that most of the others lack in its ability to 
explain the great difference we can observe in how states react and which sates do 
develop nuclear weapons. This doesn’t mean that I think that the norms model is 
perfect or always is the best to use when trying to understand every single case of 
why a state wants nuclear weapons but I think it has the most potential to explain 
the entire nuclear proliferation situation. 
Ontologically and epistemologically Constructivism also appeals to me as it 
generally walks a middle ground between more extreme positivist and non-
positivist theories. The importance of socially constructed ideas rather than human 
nature or essential characteristics of international politics is, I think, fundamental 
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in understanding how human, and by extension, states act in certain situation but 
that does not mean that there is no such thing as objective facts that can be 
measured simply that we are always guided by other things as well. Personally I 
believe that the schism between positivism and non-positivism is sometimes 
overdramatized and that both these can offer some understanding when analyzing 
a problem or question in international relations regardless of what you personally 
believe in. Post-positivism can often give a deeper theoretical understanding while 
positivism can often offer a practical solution to a given problem. To take into 
account both the importance of social and material maters and to weigh these 
against each other’s give, in my view, a deeper understanding of a given problem. 
Of course taking this kind of reasoning to far is also very problematic as you 
eventually reach the conclusion that “everything can be explained by something” 
by which time you no longer have a theory at all,  just a very obvious statement. 
 
In my opinion the debate concerning the nuclear proliferation issue, both in the 
academia but especially in politics, is far to dominated by positivist and especially 
realist argument and thoughts. Arguments used both by the IAEA and the states 
involved have their roots in realist arguments on how and why states act as they 
do and therefore miss many important nuances in international politics. However 
this does not mean that you should simply replace one theoretical dominance with 
another. To simply change from a dominant realist discourse to a dominant 
constructivist or feminist discourse would risk falling back to the same problem 
again of simplifying by trying to explain everything with one model. Instead, in my 
opinion, academics and especially politicians should be prepared to try and look at 
the problem of nuclear proliferation from all possible angles and be ready to apply 
all different models even if they do not necessarily agree with them themselves. 
Positivism and post-positivism alike have something to offer to the understanding 
of the nuclear debate and I think it is important that the actual debate reflects this 
something that is not always the case. 
This paper can give no direct answer to the main question of why states develop 
nuclear weapon but will hopefully offer a variety of answers and opinions that all 
51 
 
have their own merits and help people understand the problems that exists both 
in understanding the theories of nuclear proliferation but also the difficulty in 
what to practically do when a new state (like Iran) wants to join the nuclear club. If 
Iran really wants nuclear weapons (something that should not be taken for 
granted) convincing them to do otherwise will probably be very difficult in the long 
run.   
52 
 
5 Literature: 
Akhtar S. and Khan Z. (2014) Understanding the Nuclear Aspirations and Behaviour 
of North Korea and Iran, Strategic Analysis, 38:5, 617-633. 
Allison G. and Zelikow P. (1999) Essence of decision: explaining the Cuban Missile 
Crisis 2nd ed, Addison Wesley Longman, Inc. 
Behravesh, M. (2011). A crisis of confidence revisited: Iran-West tensions and 
mutual demonization. Asian Politics & Policy, 3:3, 327-347.  
Bart S. (2012) Iran's nuclear program: civil and/or military goals?, 
Defense & Security Analysis, 28:3, 213-225. 
Barzashka I. and Oelrich I. (2012) Iran and nuclear ambiguity, Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs, 25:1, 1-26. 
Baylis J. Smith S. and Owen P. (2008) The Globalization of World Politics 4th ed, 
Oxford University Press. 
Björkdahl, A. (2002a) Norms in international relations: Some conceptual and 
methodological reflections, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 15:1, 9-23. 
Björksahl, A. (2002b) From Idea to Norm. Promoting Conflict Prevention, Lund 
University.  
Chubin S. (2014) Is Iran a Military Threat?, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy  
56:2, 65-88. 
Clarke M. (2013) Iran as a ‘pariah’ nuclear aspirant, Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, 67: 4, 491-510. 
Dafoe A., Renshon J. and Huth P. (2014) Reputation and Status as Motives for War, 
Annual Review of Political Science, 17:371–93. 
Patrick D. (2012) KICKING THE HORNETS’ NEST, The Nonproliferation Review, 19:2, 
159-175. 
53 
 
Duncanson C. and Eschle C. (2008) Gender and the Nuclear Weapons State: A 
Feminist Critique of the UK Government’s White Paper on Trident, New Political 
Science, 30: 4, 545-563  
 
Einhorn R. J. (2006) IDENTIFYING NUCLEAR ASPIRANTS AND THEIR PATHWAYS TO 
THE BOMB, The Nonproliferation Review, 13:3, 491-499. 
Esberg J. & Sagan S. D. (2012) NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, 
Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy, The Nonproliferation Review, 19:1, 95-108. 
Finnemore, M. & Sikkink, K. (1998). International norm dynamics and political 
change, International Organization, 52:4, 887-917.  
Fitzpatrick M. (2006) LESSONS LEARNED FROM IRAN'S PURSUIT OF NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS, The Nonproliferation Review, 13:3, 527-537. 
George A. L. and Smoke R. (1974) Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory 
and Practice, Colombia University Press. 
Gustafsson K. (2014) Memory Politics and Ontological Security in Sino-Japanese 
Relations, Asian Studies Review, 38:1, 71–86 
 
Homan P. (2013) EXPLORING THE NEXT GENERATION OF PROLIFERATORS, 
The Nonproliferation Review, 20:1, 63-80, 
 
Hymans J. E. C. (2006) THEORIES OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, The 
Nonproliferation Review, 13:3, 455-465,  
 
Hymans J. E.C. and Matthew S. (2013) IRAN AND THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD. 
Gratias Published online: 26 
Jones P. (2012) LEARNING TO LIVE WITH A NUCLEAR IRAN, The Nonproliferation 
Review, 19:2, 197-217. 
Kinnvall C. (2006) Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the 
Search for Ontological Security, Political Psychology, 25: 5, 741-767. 
 
Kirby P. (2012) How is rape a weapon of war? Feminist International Relations, 
modes of critical explanation and the study of wartime sexual violence, European 
Journal of International Relations, 19:4, 797–821. 
 
54 
 
Lavoy P. R. (2006) NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION OVER THE NEXT DECADE, The 
Nonproliferation Review, 13:3, 433-454. 
 
Lebow R. N. (2011) Philosophy and International Relations, International Affairs, 
87:5, 1219-1228. 
 
Luongo K. N. (2014) Roadmap for Success of the Nuclear Security Summits and 
Beyond, Strategic Analysis, 38:2, 185-196. 
 
Mayer C. C. (2004) NATIONAL SECURITY TO NATIONALIST MYTH: WHY IRAN 
WANTS NUCLEAR WEAPONS, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. 
 
McSweeney, B. (1999). Security, identity and interests: A sociology of International 
relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mitzen. J. (2006) Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the 
Security Dilemma, European Journal of International Relations, 12:3, 341-370. 
Mousavian, S.H. (2012) Globalising Iran's Fatwa Against Nuclear Weapons, 
Survival, 55:2, 147-162. 
Mun S. A. (2011) What Is the Root Cause of the North Korean Nuclear Program?, 
Asian Affairs: An American Review, 38: 175–187.  
 
Nia M. M. (2010) Understanding Iran’s Foreign Policy: 
An Application of Holistic Constructivism, Alternatives: Turkish Journal of 
International Relations, 9:1, 148-180 
 
O’Reilly K. P. (2012) Leaders’ Perceptions and Nuclear Proliferation: A Political 
Psychology Approach to Proliferation, Political Psychology, 33:6, 767-789 
 
Reshmi K. (2015) Overcoming Pakistan’s Nuclear Dangers by Mark Fitzpatrick, 
Strategic Analysis, 39:1, 100-102. 
Sagan. S. D. (1996-1997), International Security, Why Do States Build Nuclear 
Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb, 21:3, 54-86 
Sagan. S. D. (2011) The Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation, Annual Review of 
Political Science, 14: 225–244. 
 
Sagan S., Waltz K. and. Betts R. K. (2007) A NUCLEAR IRAN: PROMOTING STABILITY 
OR COURTING DISASTER?, Journal of International Affairs, 60, 135-150. 
55 
 
 
Sagan S. D. and Waltz K. (2010) The great debate: Is nuclear zero the best option?, 
National Interest, 109, 88-96. 
 
Senn M. and Elhardt C. (2014) Bourdieu and the bomb: Power, language and the 
doxic battle over the value of nuclear weapons, European Journal of International 
Relations, 20:2, 316–340. 
 
Shahram. C. (2014) Is Iran a Military Threat?, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 
56:2, 65-88. 
Sherrill. C. W (2012) WHY IRAN WANTS THE BOMB AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR US 
POLICY, The Nonproliferation Review, 19:1, 31-49. 
Shilling. T. C (2008): Arms and Influence, Yale University Press. 
Smet S. (2010) Motivations, Decision-making Process and Non-technical Indicators 
of Nuclear (Non--) Proliferation, Conference Papers -- International Studies 
Association. 2010 Annual Meeting, p1. University of Antwerp. 
Waltz. K. (1990) Nuclear Myths and Political Realities, The American Political 
Science Revoew, 84:3, 731-745 
Waltz. K. N. and Sagan. S. D. (2003) The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate 
Renewed, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 
Waltz K. (2012): Why Iran Should Get the Bomb Nuclear Balancing Would Mean 
Stability, Strategic Analysis 91:4, 2-5. 
Williams P. D. (2013) Security Studies an Introduction 2nd ed, Routledge 
Woods M. (2007) Unnatural acts, Nuclear language, proliferation and order, Journal 
of Language and Politics 6:1, 91–128. 
Zanvyl K. and Ariel Roth I. (2007), Nuclear Weapons in Neo-Realist Theory, 
International Studies Review, 9, 369–384. 
 
 
 
56 
 
Homepages: 
 
CIA The World Factbooc: Iran https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ir.html 
 
The Fund for Peace, Failed State Index: http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/ 
 
